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Abstract. The ethics of financial reporting assumes a center stage in the corporate world in 
the background of an emerging understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We 
review the literature on the link between earnings management (EM) and CSR and reveal 
that there are two contradictory perspectives. One perspective assumes that EM is 
negatively associated to CSR, while the other argues that EM and CSR are positively 
related. These perspectives are based on the competitive existence theories such as agency, 
singling, stakeholder, legitimacy theories. While, the negative relationship between EM and 
CSR perspective is in line with the legitimacy, agency and singling theories, the positive 
relationship is in accordance with stakeholder theory.  
Key words: earnings management, corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory, agency theory 
INTRODUCTION 
Accounting earnings are one of the most commonly used measures of firm performance. 
Given that the flexibility of accounting standards provides the executive managers of a firm 
with considerable opportunities for practicing discretion over reported earnings, it is not 
surprising that executives manipulate earnings when the interests between them and 
stakeholders are conflicted. This opportunistic behavior is known in the literature as 
Earnings Management (EM). It has been acknowledged that the practice of EM may reduce 
the financial reports‟ reliability and quality, their usefulness for investment decisions and 
the shareholders‟ confidence in financial statements. In addition, EM has a negative impact 
on a firm such as, losing stakeholders‟ support, legal actions could be taken by regulators 
against the firm, the firm‟s products and services may be boycotted, it is likely to be 
deemed as illegitimate by the local community and it could be exposed by the media. 
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Ultimately, these actions by outsiders may damage the firm‟s reputation, and could result in 
the managers losing their jobs. 
On the other hand, in the last few decades, the corporate world has been predisposed 
by the growing awareness on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and become more 
conscientious on how they generate and expend profits. Currently, firms are more 
concerned about their ethical and moral behavior, and their relationship with relevant 
societal interest groups. It has been accepted that firms can gain multiple advantages 
through building a positive image among the stakeholders, and in establishing social 
bonds with employees and the local community, which generates reputational gains. In 
practice, those companies who implement CSR activities are bound to provide 
transparent and reliable financial information. Some authors demonstrate a commitment 
to ethical and accountable behavior. However, there is an argument that CSR can be used 
as an entrenchment mechanism to achieve managers „self-interest objectives by distorting 
earnings information.  
Hence, the aim of this paper is to review the literature on the link between EM and CSR.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides EM background.  
Section 2 presents background on CSR. Section 3 reviews the literature and relevant 
theoretical perspectives on CSR and EM. In the last section conclusion is presented. 
1. EM BACKGROUND 
Accounting earnings are one of the most significant components in the financial 
reporting to provide information about a company‟s performance to various stakeholder 
groups who are interested in the company‟s activates, such as investors, the government, 
professional institutions, lenders and employees. Since these various stakeholder groups 
would not have the authority to access this information compared to firm‟s insiders, 
financial reporting is considered as the main resource used by investors to make 
investment decisions. The revelations of massive accounting scandals involving large 
corporations (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, etc.) indicate that managers have incentives to use 
their discretion over reported earnings either to mislead shareholders about the firm‟s 
underlying financial performance or to gain some private benefits at the expense of other 
stakeholders (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The flexibility of the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) allows managers to use some discretion to estimate 
reported earnings that might be not accurately reflect the company‟s underlying 
economic conditions (Prior et al., 2008). This opportunist behavior of using managers‟ 
discretion is known as earnings management (EM).  
EM is the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of GAAP to bring about 
a desired level of reported earnings (Davidson et al. 1987). Similarly, Schipper (1989, p.92) 
states that EM is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gains”. In addition, Parfet (2000) illustrates that EM is not 
entirely a bad thing if reasonable and proper practices of EM are used in a well-managed 
business and deliver value to shareholders. In the same vein, Beneish (2001) indicates that 
opportunistic and informative are two perspectives of EM. While opportunistic EM seeks 
either to mislead investors or to secure managers‟ jobs, reputations, and compensation within 
the firm, the informative EM aims to provide private information to the investors about the 
firm‟s future performance. In order to determine whether EM is opportunistic behavior or 
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informative exercise, it is important to identify managers‟ intent. Hence, many attempts have 
been made in the literature to identify various motivations to manage earnings. However, in 
some case the opportunistic earnings managing leads to financial fraud, for more see (Marai 
and Pavlović, 2013).  
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 370), there are three major incentives to 
manage earnings: capital market, contractual arrangements and regulatory considerations. 
With regard to capital market, previous capital market literature indicates that issuing 
equities and beating or meeting analysis‟ forecasts may motivate managers to manipulate 
earnings (Chen et al., 2010; Hafzalla, 2009; Payne and Robb, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). In terms of contractual arrangements, managers have incentives to manipulate 
reported earnings to influence borrowing and compensation contracts in order to avoid 
the violation of debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) or to gain better bonus 
rewards (Healy, 1985). As a result of the external pressure from authorities on the firm 
regarding product prices and market share, mangers may prefer to manage earnings to 
give the impression that their firms are less profitable than they actually are (Prior et al., 
2008). In addition to these motivations, Prior et al. (2008) state that achieving mangers‟ 
private gains is one of the main reasons why mangers manipulate reported earnings. 
It is worth mentioning that there are two common types of EM: real and accrual-based 
EM. In terms of real EM, managers can manipulate earnings via modifying corporate 
transactions, such as reducing expenditures on research and development, advertising, 
employee training to increase earnings (Guillamon-Saorin and  Osma, 2010).  Although 
this type of EM is less likely to be detected by auditors and regulators, it is generally 
believed to be a more costly form of EM (Hong and Andersen, 2011). On the other hand, 
accrual-based EM occurs when managers used their judgment to estimate firm‟s accruals 
portion without making any changes to real corporate activity such as estimating 
provisions for dubious accounts and deferring tax assets (Guidry et al., 1999; McNichols  
and Wilson, 1988). Because this type of manipulation is accounting based, it is generally 
believed to be a less costly form of EM compared to real EM, and thereby, preferred by 
managers (Beneish, 2001).  
It has been argued that EM is more likely to reduce the financial reports‟ reliability and 
quality, their usefulness for investment decisions and the shareholders‟ confidence in the 
financial statements (Chen et al., 2010). In addition, Fombrun et al. (2000a) argue that EM 
has a negative impact on a firm such as losing stakeholders‟ support, legal actions could be 
taken by regulators against the firm, the firm‟s products and services may be boycotted, it is 
likely to be deemed as illegitimate by the local community and it could be exposed by the 
media. Such actions by outsiders may damage the firm‟s reputation, and could result in the 
managers losing their jobs (Prior et al., 2008). In order to avoid or mitigate opportunistic 
EM negative consequences, managers have incentives to compensate stakeholders through 
engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities.  
2. CSR BACKGROUND 
According to the classical viewpoint, a firm is only accountable to its shareholders 
and therefore its role in society is to maximize its economic value, which in turn 
increases the wealth of its shareholders. Hence, managers‟ responsibility is to act in the 
interest of the firm‟s shareholders and they have no right to engage in social projects that 
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do not maximize the returns of the business (Friedman, 1962). In general, the classical 
viewpoint assumes that the only social responsibility of a business entity is to use its 
resources to engage in activities that increase its profits without resorting to deception or 
fraud (Friedman, 1962, p.112). However, in the last few decades, the role of corporation 
has changed as a result of CSR developments. Thus, corporations are now not only 
accountable for generating profits for shareholders but also have responsibilities in terms 
of how they generate these profits. Thus, firms have been forced to become more 
concerned about their ethical and moral behavior as well as their relationship with 
societal interest groups and their social responsibility (Held, 1970).   
Given that CSR is related to complex issues such as environmental protection, human 
resources management, health and safety at work, local community relations, and 
relationships with suppliers and customers, engagement in such activities might be costly 
for firms (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). However, several incentives have been reported 
in the literature to motivate CSR implementation in general and motivate companies to 
implement natural environmental management in particular. For example, Branco and 
Rodrigues (2006) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) argue that CSR activities assist firms to 
enhance their transparency and build a positive image among stakeholders, which in turn 
helps them to gain support from the society in which they operate. According to Fombrun 
et al. (2000b), a positive image helps managers to establish social bonds between the 
company, its employees and the local community, and generates reputational gains that 
improve the firm‟s ability to attract resources, enhance its performance, and build a 
competitive advantage. In addition, Fombrun et al. (2000b, p.85) describe five 
complementary motivations that induce firms to engage in and pursue CSR activities: (1) 
Build community ties and maintain a license to operate; (2) Increase morale and 
attachment of current employees; (3) Prepare and attract potential employees; (4) 
Develop potential customers; and (5) Enact an environment where the company can 
prosper. Furthermore, Branco and Rodrigues (2006) demonstrate that, by engaging in 
social activities, firms can gain support from their various stakeholders and obtain more 
favorable regulatory treatments, endorsements from activist groups, legitimacy from the 
community, and favorable coverage from the media. Therefore, these activities may help 
firms to avoid the potentially detrimental impact of government actions. Thus, engaging 
in corporate social responsibility may have positive impacts on the firm‟s reputation 
within society and may enhance the position of the managers within the firm, particularly 
when they practice their duties in accordance with the principles of CSR.  
Despite the advantages of engaging in CSR, it has been argued that managers might 
have incentives to use CSR activities as a strategic tool to compensate stakeholders 
influence how they perceive the real future of the firm, distracting attention from any 
activities that reduces financial reporting quality (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). In 
addition, DeMaCarty (2009) argues that skillful managers may be able to profit 
personally through measuring CSR, and that this could be the reason for the positive 
relationship between CSR and financial performance reported in previous studies. As a 
result, CSR may be adopted by firms in order to create an impression of transparency 
among the stakeholder groups and then legitimize their activities in order to gain 
stakeholders support (Kim et al., 2012). From this viewpoint, engaging in CSR activities 
is driven from opportunistic behavior rather than moral obligations. 
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3. EM AND CSR PERSPECTIVES 
The separation between ownership and control in modern corporations, together with 
the presence of information asymmetries within companies, spawn the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior by managers from those of the owners, and hence pursue self-
interning objectives (the agency problem) (Prior et al., 2008). Given that managers 
practice EM either to gain some private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders or to 
mislead shareholders about the firm‟s underlying financial performance (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999), it has been acknowledge that EM is considered as a type of agency cost 
because managers look after their own interests by releasing financial reporting that do 
not reflect an accurate economic picture of the company (Prior et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, corporate reported information is viewed as a form of monitoring mechanism used 
by investors and other external users to reduce the information asymmetry problem 
(Huang  and Zhang, 2011). Hence, information disclosed in financial reporting is 
considered as one of the possible solutions to reduce the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders (Eng  and Mak, 2003). 
Theoretically, EM and CSR are linked through two perspectives. First, it has been 
argued that firms with strong commitments to CSR are less likely to manage earnings 
since they do not hide unfavorable earnings realizations and, therefore, conduct no EM 
(Chih et al., 2008). Since EM is perceived as an irresponsible act with CSR principles, 
Choi et al. (2013) argue that firms with strong commitment to CSR are more prone to act 
in a responsible way when reporting their financial statements. Likewise, Kim et al. 
(2012)  point out  that  companies  that  expend  their efforts  and  resources  in  designing  
CSR programs  and  implement  these  programs  to  address  the  ethical  interests  of 
stakeholders follow more transparent and reliable financial reporting and less likely to 
manage earnings.  
Inversely, the second perspective suggests that managers who manage earnings may 
strategically use CSR information to disguise their opportunistic behavior (Prior et al., 
2008). According to Prior et al. (2008), managers who engage in EM may resort to CSR 
to deal with their stakeholders‟ activism and vigilance (Prior et al., 2008). In line with 
this argument, Choi et al. (2013) argue that managers who act in pursuit of private 
benefits by distorting earnings information are able to entrench themselves through 
engaging in CSR activities. 
Empirically, the studies of Choi et al. (2013); Kim et al. (2012); and Chih et al. (2008) 
found that EM is negatively related to CSR suggesting that firms with strong 
commitment to CSR are less likely to engage in EM. On the other hand, several studies 
have found that EM and CSR are positively related (Gargouri et al., 2010; Prior et al., 
2008; Patten  and Trompeter, 2003) and suggesting that firms with a higher level of EM 
resort to CSR activities to disguise managerial opportunistic behavior.   
The stakeholder theory offers a beneficial foundation for research into the connection 
between EM and CSR. According to the stakeholder theory, CSR is seen as obligatory for 
the firm to discharge wider accountability norms by providing information to relevant 
stakeholders (Buhr, 2001; Guay et al., 1996). The stakeholder theory is about  groups  
and  individuals  who  can  affect or be affected by  the organization,  and  how the 
organizations manage those  groups and individuals (Freeman, 1984). The theory further 
views that organizations have a duty and obligation to a wider range of stakeholders 
(Buhr, 2001; Guay et al., 1996) and the managers decisions need to incorporate the 
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interests of all stakeholders (Grougiou et al., 2014). However, this perspective provides a 
prescription for how managers can undertake strategies to manage and treat their various 
stakeholders; it does not have a direct role in predicting managerial behavior in practice 
(Deegan, 2002). Since the firm is perceived as a multilateral set of relationships amongst 
stakeholders, Grougiou et al. (2014) indicate that since mangers attempt to attend a 
multilateral set of stakeholders objectives, the information asymmetry between mangers 
and stakeholder is high. The existence of information asymmetry provides managers an 
opportunity to practice EM. Further to this, Hoque (2006) argues that managers 
manipulate earnings to improve their private interests at the expense of other 
stakeholders. Moreover, Grougiou et al. (2014); and Sun et al. (2010) illustrate that 
companies that engage in CSR to negotiate diverse stakeholders interests are 
inadvertently expected to practice EM. Thus one can assume a positive relationship 
between EM and CSR in the stakeholder theory framework. 
Since the engagement with CSR is one of the management strategies to endorse firm‟s 
legitimacy (Grougiou et al., 2014), we looked into the views of the legitimacy theory on 
our central issue. The legitimacy theory is perceived as a generalized perception that the 
actions of any entity are desirable within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p.574), argues that an organization 
activities must be legitimate in the eyes of society if it is to be allowed to continue its 
operations. Hence, if a company loses its legitimacy, society may revoke its contract and 
prevent it from continuing its operations (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Guthrie  and Parker, 
1989). Various strategies that firms can adopt in order to maintain their legitimacy within 
the society in which they operate, and all these strategies can be involved to make social 
disclosure as a means of showing that firms are conforming to society‟s expectations 
(Dowling  and Pfeffer, 1975). Although a firm may choose CSR to maintain or increase 
perceptions of its legitimacy (Patten, 1992), it may use this as a means of anticipating or 
avoiding social pressure as well as enhancing the firm‟s image or reputational status 
(Gray et al., 1988). In terms of EM, Sun et al. (2010) indicate that managers who 
manipulate earnings tend to realize that CSR can be used to maintain the firm‟s 
legitimacy, specifically with social and political stakeholders. Thus the CSR is seen as a 
means of informing stakeholders on the wider interests of the firm and of its 
accountability which prompts the firm to behave in a socially responsible manner.   
It is also possible that managers would be involved in activities that could indirectly 
harm the company and stakeholders except managers. The separation of ownership and 
management of a company, together with existence conflicts problem and information 
asymmetry, could create serious problems because mangers are more concerned about 
their job security, rewards, ability to remain in power, and to maximize their own wealth 
(Morris, 1987). Agency problems occur and conflicts arise between managers and owners 
when the managers act for their own benefits rather than optimizing the firms‟ value from 
the stakeholders‟ viewpoint (Watts  and Zimmerman, 1986). Information asymmetry 
occurs when managers have superior access to the information as compared to the owners 
(Fields et al., 2001). While managers work in the firm every day and are knowledgeable 
about all business transactions and affairs, stakeholders, on the other hand, depend on 
periodic sources of information, such as annual and interim reports to enable them to 
valuate firm‟s value. Thus, information asymmetry will be higher if the quality of 
information is low. Managers could undertake opportunistic EM to achieve their 
objectives, which in turn, increasing firm‟s agency cost. Since agency relationships suffer 
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from the problems of conflict of interest and information asymmetry, an optimal solution 
should be discovered to control such problems. Several solutions have been introduced in 
the literature to solve firm‟s agency problems. For example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) argue that the transparency and accountability system is one of the solutions that 
should be put in place in order to avoid agency problems. Jo and Kim (2007) argue that 
EM occurs less in companies that disclose more information on their social activities, 
because when the information transparency is increased, it is expected that the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors will decrease, which will enable 
investors to detect EM. Likewise, Eisenhardt (1989, p.60) states that “….since 
information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing, they are 
likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or she cannot 
deceive the principal”. Similarly, Shleifer (2004) argues that manipulation of earnings 
occurs less often in corporations with a strong commitment to CSR. In addition, Chih et 
al. (2008) state that a strong commitment to CSR principles prevents managers from 
using their opportunistic discretion over earnings. 
Finally, in terms of the signaling theory, Gray (2007) illustrates that firms with high-
quality information tend to use CSR as an alternative to the classical financial reporting, 
while low-quality information companies choose non-disclosure, consistent with 
constrained accounting information. In addition, Gray argues that the quality of company 
reports is a signal to investors and financial markets that managers are able to control 
social risks within the company. Likewise, Sun et al. (2010) indicate that corporate 
environment disclosure as a part of CSR is a signal to investors and other powerful and 
economic stakeholders that the company is actively taking part in CSR and that its market 
value is in good condition. According to the signaling theory, a company discloses 
information to reduce information asymmetry and to signal to investors that it is 
performing better than its competitors (Álvarez et al., 2008; Miller, 2002). However, 
Hughes (1986) states that the credibility of information provided by a firm is an essential 
element in ensuring lower information asymmetry. Given that EM is more likely to occur 
when information asymmetry is high, the signaling theory assumes that CSR information 
is used as a means to reduce the information symmetry (agency problem) between 
companies and their investors. Therefore, based on the notion that CSR information is a 
useful tool for reducing information asymmetry, prior studies predicted a negative 
association between CSR information and information asymmetry (Heflin et al., 2005; 
Brown et al., 2004; Coller  and Yohn, 1997; Welker, 1995), which indicates a negative 
relationship between EM and CSR.     
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to review the link between EM and CSR. This review reveals 
that EM and CSR are linked through two contradictory perspectives. Since EM is 
perceived as an irresponsible act and inconsistent with CSR principles, the first 
perspective argues that firms with strong commitment to CSR are more prone to act in a 
responsible way when reporting their financial statements. On the other hand, the second 
perspective argues that CSR can be used as an effective tool in dealing with stakeholder 
activism and vigilance when managers manipulate earnings. 
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In line with these perspectives, it can be concluded that the empirical previous studies 
have found mixed and contradictory results. While several studies find that EM and CSR 
are negatively related, others find that EM and CSR are positively related.   
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UPRAVLJANJE DOBITKOM I NJEGOVA VEZA SA 
KORPORATIVNOM DRUŠTVENOM ODGOVORNOŠĆU 
U korporativnom svetu danas, etika finansijskog izveštavanja podrazumeva i razumevanje 
koncepta korporativne društvene odgovornosti.  Istražili smo dostupnu literaturu pokušavajući da 
uspostavimo vezu između upravljanja dobitkom i korporativne društvene odgovornosti i kao 
rezultat došli smo do zaključka da su to dve potpuno različite perspektive. Jedna podrazumeva da 
je upravljanje dobitkom negativno korelirano sa korporativnom društvenom odgovornošću, dok 
druga dokazuje da su pozitivno korelisane. Ove perspektive su zasnovane na teorijama  kao što su 
agencijska, teorija signala, teorija stejkholdera i teorija legitimnosti.  Negativna veza između 
upravljanja dobitkom i korporativne društvene odgovornosti je u skladu sa teorijom legitimnosti, 
agencijskom i teorijom signala, dok je pozitivna veza u skladu sa postulatima teorije stejkholdera. 
Ključne reči: upravljanje dobitkom, korporativna društvena odgovornost, teorija stejkholdera, 
teorija legitimnosti, agencijska teorija 
 
